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Abstract
This paper incorporates self-fulfilling mistakes into an otherwise classical decision-making
framework. A behavioural agent makes a mistake when he fails to internalize all the consequences
of his actions on himself. We show that Sen’s axioms α and γ fully characterize choice data
consistent with behavioral agents. These two axioms are weaker than Sen’s axioms α and β that
fully characterize rational agents. We offer a welfare benchmark that can be applied to existing
behavioural economics models and show the conditions under which our welfare ranking can be
used to infer welfare dominated (i.e. mistaken) choices using choice data alone.
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Standard normative economics employs the revealed preference approach to extract welfare
measures from choice data. The preferences revealed from the individual’s choices are assumed
to be identical to the normative preferences representing the individual’s best interest. There is,
however, considerable empirical evidence that in an array of different situations, individuals do not
appear to act in their own best interest, establishing a potential wedge between normative and
revealed preferences.1
How should welfare analysis be performed if choices do not always reveal decision-makers’ (DMs)
best interest? One approach, advocated in an influential contribution by Bernheim and Rangel
(2009) (hereafter BR), proposes a welfare criterion that can be applied even when observed choices
are inconsistent: briefly, x is (strictly) unambiguously chosen over y if y is never chosen when x is
available.2 Hence, regardless of how poorly behaved choice correspondences may be, their criterion
implies that every action chosen (within a welfare-relevant domain) is a (weak) welfare optimum
(BR, observation 1, pg. 62). While this approach can exploit the coherent aspects of choice in
a variety of behavioural models, it is silent about situations in which DMs may make mistakes
in a systematic way, acting against their own best interest. That is, x may be unambiguously
chosen over y, but still be against the DM’s best interest. This is particularly relevant for models
of addiction, projection bias, aspirations failure or overconfidence.
In light of the above, this paper studies DMs who, in contrast to rational ones, may not fully
internalize all the consequences of their actions on themselves. We offer a general framework to
model self-fulfilling mistakes, provide a choice-theoretic characterization of that framework, contrast
it with the rational framework and propose a revealed welfare ranking able to identify dominated
choice under a domain restriction.
Section 1 introduces the general framework, shows existence of a solution and describes some
behavioural models encompassed in our framework. We model a DM who must choose between
mutually exclusive actions. Each action impacts on payoffs, both directly and indirectly through its
effect on a psychological state via a feedback function. We broadly interpret a psychological state as
any pay-off relevant endogenous preference parameter that is assumed to be normatively irrelevant
in a conventional account of rationality. This includes frames, reference points, beliefs, expectations,
aspirations, states of mind, emotions, moods, deadlines, default options, etc. The DM’s preferences
rank both actions and psychological states. Mistakes (suboptimal behaviour) arise due to the DM’s
propensity to undertake actions without fully internalizing their consequences on own psychological
1Loewenstein and Ubel (2008) point out that in the “heat of the moment,” people often take actions that
they would not have intended to take and that they soon come to regret (Loewenstein, 1996). Koszegi and
Rabin (2008) and Beshears et. al. (2008) review empirical evidence of systematic mistakes people make.
Bernheim and Rangel (2007) record situations in which it is clear that people act against themselves: an
anorexic’s refusal to eat; people save less than what they would like; people fail to take advantage of low
interest loans available through life insurance policies; they unsuccessfully attempt to quit smoking; they
maintain substantial balances on high-interest credit cards; etc.
2Salant and Rubinstein (2008) make a similar point in their analysis of choice with exogenous frames.
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states.3
We consider two types of decision making procedures: a Standard Decision Procedure (SDP)
and Behavioural Decision Procedure (BDP). In a SDP, the DM fully internalizes the feedback
from actions to psychological states, and chooses an action that maximizes his preferences over
consistent pairs of actions and psychological states. This is equivalent to rational decision-making in
a context with endogenous psychological states.4 In a BDP, in contrast, a (behavioural) DM fails to
internalize the effect of his action on his psychological state, and chooses an action taking as given his
psychological state although psychological states and actions are required to be mutually consistent
at a BDP outcome, i.e. the mistakes the DM makes are self-fulfilling. This is a form of bounded
rational decision-making in a context where psychological states are endogenous.5 Importantly,
note that choices of behavioural DMs can be systematically coherent (in BR’s sense) but yet be
suboptimal.
Despite its simplicity, by appropriately specifying actions sets, psychological states, the feedback
from actions to psychological states and the domain of preferences, our framework unifies seemingly
disconnected models in the literature, from more recent positive behavioural economics models to
older ones. In Section 1.3 we illustrate this feature by linking our framework to models of status-quo
bias, reference-dependent consumption, time-inconsistent preferences, adaptive preferences, utility
from anticipation and aspirations.
Section 2 introduces the axioms that fully characterize both decision procedures (BDP and
SDP) based solely on choice data. We assume that neither the set of psychological states nor the
feedback function are directly observable. Rather, they have to be inferred from choice behavior.
We show that (i) Sen’s (1971) axioms α and β fully characterize an admissible SDP,6 (ii) observed
choices are compatible with an BDP if and only they satisfy Sen’s (1971) axioms α and γ,7 and
3The key premise is that individuals are able to forecast the short-run consequences of their actions on
preferences (e.g., the immediate, desirable nicotine rush from smoking) but they cannot forecast correctly
the consequences of their actions on psychological states and their impact on preferences (e.g. nicotine
dependence resulting from smoking). There is evidence that individuals misjudge either self or contingencies
(Baumeister and Scher, 1988), fail to bear in mind that they will adapt (Ubel, 2005), overestimate regret
or rejoicing (Sevdalis and Harvey, 2007), underestimate the use of coping strategies in the face of negative
shocks (Lazarus and Flokman, 1984; Deci and Ryan, 2008), etc.
4Example of standard DMs are people who self-impose deadlines to overcome procrastination (Ariely and
Wertenbroch, 2002), who limit the number of alternatives (limited focus) as a self-control device to avoid
regret (Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000) or who choose an optimal aspiration level as motivator of effort (Heath
et al., 1999).
5In the online Appendix, we extend our framework and allow for DMs who partially internalize the
consequences of their actions. The main results of this paper still hold for this more general case.
6In an admissible SDP, the ranking over consistent decision states is transitive. A consistent decision
state is a pair of an action and psychological state so that the psychological state is an element of the feedback
function.
7Sen’s axiom α states that the choice correspondence is (weakly) increasing as the choice set shrinks when
all alternatives chosen in the larger set are also present in the smaller set. This axiom was also introduced
by Chernoff (1954). Sen’s axiom β states that when two actions are both chosen in a given set, and one of
them is chosen in a larger set that includes the first set, then both are chosen in the larger set. Sen’s axiom
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(iii) whenever choice data satisfy Sen’s axioms α and γ (but violate β), it is required at least two
psychological states for such data to be rationalized as the outcome of an admissible BDP.8
The axiomatic characterization of SDPs and BDPs is relevant for two main reasons. First, it
shows that regardless how seemingly disconnected some behavioural economic models may be, they
are characterized by the same underlying choice structure. Second, the axiomatic characterization
allows us to study the normative implications of boundedly rational decision-making basing our
analysis on the information inferred from choice data.9
We devote Section 3 to discuss the insights for welfare analysis derived from our framework. We
first define the appropriate welfare benchmark for our analysis as being the ranking over the set of
actions induced by the ranking of consistent decision states. The choice of this ranking is based on
the following two results: (i) by Proposition 2, this ranking coincides with revealed preferences in
the sense of Samuelson (1938), and (ii) all admissible standard decision scenarios that rationalize
a specific piece of choice data imply the same ranking over actions. Then, we show that, under
a domain restriction on preferences, it is possible to reconstruct this welfare ranking from choice
data when the DM solves a BDP and to infer the existence of welfare dominated choice. We
finalize by applying our normative benchmark to some behavioural economics models reduced to
our framework and by examining the implications of partial internalization of the impact of actions
on psychological states. There we show that the welfare impact of a greater degree of internalisation
may be ambiguous.
All proofs are contained in the appendix. The online appendix contains some extensions, mainly
technical, of certain aspects of the model studied in this paper.
1 The General Framework
1.1 The Model
The primitives of the model consist of a set A ⊆ <K of actions, a set P ⊆ <L of psychological
states and a function pi : A→ P modeling the feedback effect from actions to psychological states.
It is assumed that pi (a) is non-empty and single-valued for each a ∈ A. A decision state is a pair
of an action and psychological state (a, p) where a ∈ A and p ∈ P . A consistent decision state is a
decision state (a, p) such that p = pi(a).10
The preferences of the DM reflects some form of ex-post utility (interpreted as experienced
utility) which depends on the chosen action a and the psychological state p. Following Harsanyi
γ states that if an action is chosen in each set in a class of sets, it must be also chosen in their union.
8In an admissible BDP, the ranking over actions for a given psychological state is transitive.
9See Manzini and Mariotti (2014) who contrast a modeless and a model-based approach to welfare
economics in the presence of a boundedly rational decision-maker and make the case for the model-based
approach.
10In the main body of the paper, it is assumed that pi(.) is single valued. The case where pi(.) is multi-valued
is studied in the online Appendix.
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(1954) we assume intrapersonal comparability of utility. That is, the DM is not only able to rank
different elements in A for a given p, but he is also able to assess the subjective satisfaction he
derives from an action when the psychological state is p with the subjective satisfaction he derives
from another action when the psychological state is p′. In other words, we assume that the DM is
able to rank elements in A×P . Given intrapersonal comparability of utility, the preferences of the
DM are denoted by , a binary relation ranking pairs of decision states in (A× P )× (A× P ). A
decision scenario is, thus, a collection D = (A,P, pi,).
We study two decision procedures:
1. Given a non-empty feasible set of actions A′ ⊆ A, a standard decision procedure (SDP ) is
one where the DM chooses a consistent decision state (a, p), a ∈ A′ and p = pi (a). The outcomes
of a SDP , denoted by S ⊆ A× P , are
S =
{
(a, p) : (a, pi(a))  (a′, pi(a′)) for all a′ ∈ A′} .
2. Given a non-empty feasible set of actions A′ ⊆ A, a behavioural decision procedure (BDP )
is one where the DM takes as given the psychological state p when choosing a ∈ A′. For a fixed
p ∈ P , define a preference relation p over A as follows:
a p a′ ⇔ (a, p) 
(
a′, p
)
.
The outcomes of a BDP , denoted by B ⊆ A× P , are
B =
{
(a, p) : a p=pi(a) a′ for all a′ ∈ A′
}
.
In both, SDPs and BDPs, a decision outcome must be a consistent decision state where the
action is chosen from some feasible set of actions. In a SDP, the DM internalizes that his psycho-
logical state is determined by his action via the feedback effect when choosing an action from the
set of feasible actions. In a BDP, the DM takes the psychological state as given when he chooses an
action from the set of feasible actions although the psychological state is required to be consistent
with the action actually chosen by the DM.11
1.2 Existence
Motivated by the literature of behavioural economics, we prove existence of solutions to a SDP
and a BDP allowing for preferences to be incomplete, non-convex and acyclic (i.e. not necessarily
11In subsection 1.3.2 below, we show that a BDP corresponds to the steady-state outcome of an adaptive
preference adjustment mechanism.
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transitive) and action sets to be non-convex.12 We show (i) existence of a solution to a SDP
applying Bergstrom (1975) and (ii) existence of a solution to a BDP extending Ghosal’s (2011)
result for normal-form games.13 In what follows, we endow <K ×<L with the standard topology.
Recall that the preferences of the DM are denoted by , a binary relation ranking pairs of
decision states in (A× P )× (A× P ). Let p (resp. ) denote the strict (asymmetric) preference
relation corresponding to p (resp. ) i.e. a p a′ if and only if a p a′ but a′ p a (resp.
(a, p)  (a′, p′) if and only if (a, p)  (a′, p′) but (a′, p′)  (a, p)). Define the sets p (a) =
{a′ ∈ A : a′ p a} (the upper section of p), −1p (a) = {a′ ∈ A : a p a′} (the lower section of
p). Define the sets  (a, p) = {(a′, p′) ∈ A× P : (a′, p′)  (a, p)} (the upper section of ), −1
(a, p) = {(a′, p′) ∈ A : (a, p)  (a′, p′)} (the lower section of ). Define a map Ψ : P → A, where
Ψ(p) = {a′ ∈ A :p (a′) = ∅}: for each p ∈ P , Ψ(p) is the set of maximal elements of the preference
relation p. Consider the following assumptions:
(A1) for each p ∈ P ,
(i) p is acyclic i.e., there is no finite set
{
a1, ..., aT
}
such that at−1 p at, t = 2, ..., T , aT p a1,
or equivalently, p is P-acyclic,
(ii) p is complete,
(iii) −1p (a) is open relative to A i.e. p has an open lower section,14
(A2) A, P are both compact lattices with the vector ordering and pi is an increasing, continuous
function,15
(A3) For each p, and a, a′, (i) if a p inf(a, a′), then sup(a, a′) p a′ (ii) if a p sup (a, a′) then
inf (a, a′) p a′ (quasi-supermodularity),
(A4) For each a ≥ a′ and p ≥ p′, (i) if a p′ a′, then a p a′ and (ii) if a′ p a then a′ p′ a
(single-crossing property),
(A5) For each p and a ≥ a′, (i) if p (a′) = ∅ and a p a′, then p (a) = ∅, and (ii) p (a) = ∅
and a′ p a, then p (a′) = ∅ (monotone closure).
Assumptions A3-A4 were introduced by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and A5 by Ghosal
12Mandler (2005) shows that incomplete preferences and intransitivity is required for “status quo mainte-
nance” to be outcome rational. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) argue that reference-dependent preferences
may not be convex.
13The seminal proof for existence of equilibria with incomplete preferences in Shafer and Sonnenschein
(1975) requires convexity both to show existence of an optimal choice and to apply Kakutani’s fix-point
theorem.
14The continuity assumption, that p has an open lower section, is weaker than the continuity assumption
made by Debreu (1959) (who requires that preferences have both open upper and lower sections), which in
turn is weaker than the assumption by Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) (who assume that preferences have
open graphs). Note that assuming p has an open lower section is consistent with p being a lexicographic
preference ordering over A.
15A lattice is a partially ordered subset of <k with the vector ordering (the usual component wise ordering:
x ≥ y if and only if xi ≥ yi for each i = 1, ..,K, and x > y if and only if both x ≥ y and x 6= y, and x y
if and only if xi > yi for each i = 1, ..,K) which contains the supremum and infimum of any two of its
elements. A lattice that is compact (in the usual topology) is a compact lattice.
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(2011).16 We are now in a position to state the following existence result:
PROPOSITION 1. (i) Under assumptions A1-A5, a solution to a BDP exists. (ii) Suppose
A is compact and pi is a continuous function. If  is acyclic and has an open lower section, a
solution to a SDP exists.17
Proof. See Appendix. 
It is worth noting that the existence result in Proposition 1 above doesn’t rely in an essential
way on assumption A1 (i) of acyclicity. If, instead, we assumed that p, for a fixed p ∈ P , was
transitive, then assumption A5 of monotone closure could be dropped entirely. For later reference,
we state this observation as the following result:
COROLLARY 1. Suppose A is compact, pi is a continuous function and p, for a fixed p ∈ P ,
is transitive. Under assumptions A1 (ii), A1 (iii) and A2-A4, a solution to a BDP exists.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 1 and Ghosal (2011). 
Hence, from the viewpoint of Proposition 1, the assumption that p for a fixed p ∈ P is
transitive is a substitute for the assumption that p for a fixed p ∈ P is acyclic and the assumption
of monotone closure.
1.3 Reduced Form Representation
We define psychological states as endogenous features of the decision-making environment that
the DM may (mistakenly) not internalize. In this part of the paper, we show, via a number of
examples, how our framework is a reduced form representation of two very different sets of models
with endogenous psychological states: (a) models in which psychological states are endogenous
because they are determined by actions (e.g. emotions, aspirations, etc.), and (b) models in which
endogenous psychological states are an equilibrium condition. Both notions of endogeneity are
captured by our framework. For an example of the latter model, consider Tversky and Kahneman
(1991)’s reference-dependent theory of riskless choice. In their framework, preferences do not
only depend on consumption bundles but also on a reference consumption bundle which “usually
corresponds to the decision-maker’s current position” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, pp. 1046).
In that sense, their idea of a reference point is interpreted in our framework as a psychological state
defined in equilibrium as DM’s current consumption.
A comprehensive list of all such models is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, in what
follows, we take a few well-known behavioural economic models and make explicit the mapping to
our framework by identifying the pi, P and A of each model, and indicating which decision-making
16Consider a pair of actions such that the first action is greater (in the usual vector ordering) than the
second action. For a fixed p, suppose the two actions are unranked by p. Then, assumption A5 requires that
either both actions are maximal elements for p or neither is maximal. The role played by this assumption
in obtaining the monotone comparative statics is clarified in Ghosal (2011).
17Note that the conditions for the existence of a solution to a SDP are weaker than the conditions for the
existence of a solution to a BDP.
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procedure (i.e. SDP or BDP) they assume.18
1.3.1 Dynamic Inconsistency(Strotz, 1956; Peleg and Yaari, 1973; Laibson, 1997)
Here we illustrate how the standard models of time-inconsistent preferences (e.g. Strotz, 1956,
Peleg and Yaari, 1973 and Laibson, 1997) can be reduced to our framework. Consider a three
period problem t = 1, 2, 3 where at each t, the DM must choose action at, where a1 ∈ A1 ,
a2 ∈ A2 (a1), a3 ∈ A3(a1, a2) and A1, A2(a1) for each a1 and A3(a1, a2) for each a1 and a2 are
non-empty sets of actions. Let A2 = ∪a1∈A1A2 (a1) and A3 = ∪(a1,a2)∈A1×A2A3(a1, a2). The
preferences of the DM over the action triple (a1, a2, a3) ∈ A1 × A2 × A3 are represented by: (i)
U1 = u(a1) + β
[
δu(a2) + δ
2u(a3)
]
, (ii) U2 = u(a2) + βδu(a3), and (iii) U3 = u(a3). Let
A˜3 (a1, a2) = arg max
a3∈A3(a1,a2)
u(a3), A˜2 (a1) = arg max
a2∈A1(a1)
u(a2) + δβu(A˜3 (a1, a2)),
where it is assumed that both A˜3 (a1, a2) and A˜2 (a1) are non-empty and single-valued.
19 Let
p ∈ P = A2 ×A3 and p = (p2, p3) =
(
A˜2 (a1) , A˜3
(
a1, A˜2 (a1)
))
= pi(a1).
P is the set of psychological states where a psychological state is an expectation of future actions
at periods t = 2, 3 when calculating the optimal actions in period t = 1 with the feedback function
pi(.) corresponding to the best responses of the two future selves to his action choice at t = 1.
A SDP is equivalent to a Strotz equilibrium where the DM at t = 1 solves
Maxa1∈A1u(a1) + β
[
δu
(
A˜2 (a1)
)
+ δ2u
(
A˜3
(
a1, A˜2 (a1)
))]
.
A BDP is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium of the intra-self game proposed by Peleg and
Yaari (1973) defined as (a∗1, p∗) such that (i) a∗1 ∈ arg maxa1∈A1 u(a1) + β
[
δu (p∗2) + δ2u (p∗3)
]
, and
(ii) p∗ = (p∗2, p∗3) = (pi(a∗1), pi(a∗1)).
1.3.2 Adaptive Preferences (von Weizsacker, 1971; Hammond, 1976; Pollak, 1978)
In a number papers, von Weizsacker (1971), Hammond (1976) and Pollak (1978) study the steady
18Other models that have a reduced form representation in our framework include models of melioration
(Herrnstein and Prelec, 1991), cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982), emotions (Bracha and
Brown, 2007) and shrouded attributes (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). In this latter case, for example, the
psychological states can be interpreted as the (endogenous) costs of the add-ons (e.g. ink of a printer) that
(behavioural) DMs fail to take into account at the moment of buying a base good (e.g. printer).
19In discussing the reduced form representation of time-inconsistent preferences (as well as in other models
in this section), we assume uniqueness for expositional convenience. With non-uniqueness, it is necessary to
extend the definition of a SDP and BDP to the case where pi(.) is no longer single-valued. We do this in the
online Appendix.
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states of adaptive preferences defined over consumption. Here we argue that the steady states
of their models have a reduced form representation in our framework. As a by product, we also
provide a dynamic interpretation of our framework.
Consider an adaptive preference adjustment mechanism where the preferences over actions at
any t, denoted by pt−1 , depend on the past psychological state. The statement a pt−1 a′ means
that the DM finds a at least as good as a′ given the psychological state pt−1. The DM takes
as given the psychological state from the preceding period. Note that an outcome of a BDP
corresponds to the steady state of an adjustment dynamics where the DM is myopic (i.e. does
not anticipate that the psychological state at t + 1 is affected by the action chosen at t). Let
h(p) = {a ∈ A : a p a′, a′ ∈ A}. For ease of exposition, assume that h(p) is unique. Fix a p0 ∈ P .
A sequence of short-run outcomes is determined by the relations at ∈ h(pt−1) and pt = pi(at),
t = 1, 2, .... At each step, the DM chooses a myopic best-response.20 Long-run outcomes are
denoted by a pair (a, p) with p = pi(a) where a is defined to be the steady-state solution to the
short-run outcome functions, i.e. a = h(pi(a)). In other words, long-run behavior corresponds to a
subset of the set of consistent decision states, namely those that are the outcome of a BDP.
In contrast, in a SDP, the DM is farsighted (i.e. anticipates that the psychological state at t+ 1
is affected by the action chosen at t). In this case, in each period t, the DM anticipates that p
adjusts to a according to pi(·) and taking this into account, chooses a. In a SDP therefore, at each t,
the DM simply chooses between different consistent decision states: the outcome of a SDP at each
t, is a pair (at, pt) where at ∈ {a ∈ A : (a, pi(a))  (a′, pi(a′)) , for all a′ ∈ A} and pt = pi(at). Note
that in this simple framework, at each period t, the DM anticipates that there is an instantaneous
adjustment of the psychological state to the chosen action. Hence, the initial psychological state in
period t, pt−1, has no impact on the DM’s choice. Moreover, with farsightedness, the dynamics of
the preference adjustment mechanism is trivial as there is an instantaneous adjustment to the the
steady-state outcome.21
Finally, note that a farsighted DM does not regret his choice. Suppose that (a, p)  (a′, p′) and
(a, p) ≺ (a′, p) with p = pi(a) and p′ = pi(a′). Then the DM solving a SDP would choose action
a, but in the subsequent period, when state p is realized he will not regret his choice although
(a, p) ≺ (a′, p), the DM will anticipate that if he chooses a′ the psychological state will adjust to p′
and, by assumption, (a, p)  (a′, p′).
In the online Appendix we consider the case in which the DM anticipates changes in short-run
20Under the assumptions required to prove Proposition 1 (existence), h(p) is increasing map of p so that
the sequence of short-run outcomes is an (component-wise) increasing sequence (as by assumption contained
in a compact set). Therefore it converges to its supremum, which is necessarily a BDP. So the existence
result in Proposition 1 covers not only cases where a solution to a BDP (equivalently, a steady-state solution
to the myopic preference adjustment mechanism) exists but also ensures that short-run outcomes converge
to a BDP.
21Non-trivial dynamics would be associated with farsighted behavior if underlying preferences or action
sets were time variant.
9
psychological states but not in the long-run. In next section, we extend our framework to one in
which the psychological state is a vector of psychological states, and the DM correctly predicts the
effect of his action on a subset of such vector and believes that he doesn’t affect the complement.22
1.3.3 Anticipatory Feelings (Caplin and Leahy, 2001)
In Caplin and Leahy’s (2001) model of anticipatory feelings, preferences do not only depend on
consumption today, but also on the feeling of anticipation of future consumption. These (endoge-
nous) feelings correspond to psychological states in our framework. We illustrate the link of Caplin
and Leahy’s (2001) and our framework by using a simple two-period deterministic version of their
model.23 Consider a DM who, at each t = 1, 2, chooses an action a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2(a1). Let
A2 = ∪a1∈A1A2(a1). An anticipatory feeling (e.g. anxiety) is a psychological state that depends
on the anticipated action. Formally, they define a function (equivalent to pi in our framework)
µ : A2 → P that associates an action in period 2 to a psychological state. The instantaneous utility
at t = 1 is u1 (a1, p) and the instantaneous utility at t = 2 is u2 (a2). The preferences of the DM at
t = 1 are u1 (a1, p) + u2 (a2) and the preferences of the DM at t = 2 are u2 (a2). Caplin and Leahy
assume that the DM solves this problem by backward induction. First, given a1 and p, the DM
solves Max u2 (a2) s.t. a2 ∈ A2(a1), with A˜2 (a1) being the set of solutions to this problem.24 Then,
he solves Max u1
(
a1, µ
(
A˜2 (a1)
))
+ u2
(
A˜2 (a1)
)
s.t. a1 ∈ A1, with A˜1 being the corresponding
set of solutions. An optimal solution (equivalent to a Strotz equilibrium) is then defined as a pair
(a˜1, a˜2) such that a˜1 ∈ A˜1 and a˜2 = A˜2 (a˜1). Note that Caplin and Leahy assume that DMs solve a
SDP: they internalize the effect of their actions on their level of anxiety. Alternatively, if the DM
was behavioural, he would solve the following maximization problem: Max u1 (a1, p)+u2
(
A˜2 (a1)
)
s.t. a1 ∈ A1. Defining Aˆ1(p) as the set of solutions of the preceding maximization problem, the
set of BDP outcomes (equivalent to the Nash equilibrium studied by Peleg and Yaari, 1973) would
consist of a triple (a∗1, a∗2, p∗) such that a∗1 ∈ Aˆ1(p∗), a∗2 = A˜2 (a∗1) and p∗ = µ(a∗2).25
1.3.4 Reference-dependent Consumption (Shalev, 2000; Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006)
In Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006) model (see also Shalev, 2000), preferences not only depend on
the consumption bundle chosen, but also on what the DM expects to consume in equilibrium.
22Considering the possibility of partial prediction of psychological states has an interesting normative
implication though, which we discuss in the welfare section of the paper.
23We are aware that Caplin and Leahy (2001) is essentially a model of uncertainty. However, we chose
a deterministic version only to avoid introducing new notation to the paper. By redefining actions and
psychological states appropriately, it is possible to show that our framework is a reduced form representation
of their model with uncertainty.
24For simplicity assume that A˜2 (a1) is non-empty and single valued for each a1.
25Caplin and Leahy (2001) provide a set of axioms underpinning the representation of preferences with
anticipatory feelings in an expected utility setting. In this sense, the choice-theoretic, axiomatic characteri-
zation we provide in this paper complements their work.
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These (endogenous) expectations correspond to psychological states in our framework. Preferences
are modeled as u(c|r) = m(c) + n(c|r), where m(c) is the intrinsic “consumption utility” that
depends on a K-dimensional consumption bundle c, and n(c|r), is the gain-loss utility relative to
endogenous reference bundles, r. Both consumption utility and gain-loss utility are separable across
dimensions, so that m(c) =
∑
kmk(ck) and n(c|r) =
∑
k nk(ck|rk). They assume that nk(ck|rk) =
µ (mk(ck)−mk(rk)), where µ(.) satisfies the properties of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) value
function. The reference bundles are determined in a Personal Equilibrium (PE) (Ko˝szegi, 2010)
by the requirement that they must be consistent with the optimal c computed conditionally on
rational forecasts of r i.e., the consumption bundle c∗ is a PE iff u(c∗|c∗) ≥ u(c′|c∗) for any other
feasible consumption bundle c′. Thus, setting A and P to be the set of feasible consumption
bundles (where a psychological state corresponds to the expected consumption) and pi to be the
identity map, in Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006), a PE is equivalent to a BDP equilibrium and SDP
is equivalent to a Choice Acclimating Personal Equilibrium (CAPE) (where u(c|c) ≥ u(c′|c′) for
any other feasible consumption bundle c′). Let C∗ denote the set of PE consumption bundles.
A Preferred Personal Equilibrium (PPE) corresponds to maxc∗∈C∗ u(c∗|c∗). Provided the set of
feasible consumption bundles is compact and u(c|c) is continuous in c, then a CAPE exists. The
existence of a PE requires the solution to a fix-point problem. The existence of a PPE follows if
the set of feasible consumption bundles is compact and u(c|c) is continuous in c, as the set of PE
is a closed subset of the set of feasible consumption bundles and hence, compact whenever the set
of feasible consumption bundles is compact.
1.3.5 Aspirations Failure (Dalton et al., 2016)
One phenomenon that cannot be accommodated by existing models, but yet can be accommodated
by our framework is the notion of aspiration failures, defined as the failure to aspire to one’s own
potential. Aspirations failures have been documented elsewhere in the literature of anthropology
and sociology (e.g. Appadurai, 2004) and recently introduced to economics by Dalton’s et al. (2016)
application of the concepts of SDP and BDP.
In their model, the utility the individual derives from choosing effort e depends not only on
the cost of effort c(e) and the benefit b(θ) of achieving final wealth θ, but also on aspirations g.
More specifically, u(e, g, θ) = b(θ) + v (x) − c(e), where x = θ−gθ and v(.) is a reference-dependent
value function that captures gains and losses relative to the reference point g. When final wealth
is equal to the aspired level of wealth θ = g, there is no gain or loss relative to the reference point.
Final wealth depends on effort e and initial wealth θ0 via the production function θ = f(e, θ0).
At any solution to the decision problem, aspirations are set equal to final wealth given effort i.e.,
g = f(e, θ0), and (e, g = f(e, θ0)) is a consistent effort-aspirations pair. They consider two types of
DMs: a standard and a behavioural. A standard DM chooses among consistent effort-aspirations
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pairs (e, f(e, θ0)), i.e., the feedback between effort and aspirations is fully internalized. Formally, a
standard solution is then a pair (eˆ, gˆ) such that
eˆ ∈ arg max
e∈[0,1]
s(e, θ0) = u(e, f(e, θ0), f(e, θ0)) = b(f(e, θ0)) + v (0)− c(e)
and gˆ = f(ê, θ0). As v(0) enters the above expression as an additive constant, the induced utility
at a SDP is reference-independent so that it is assumed without loss of generality that v(0) = 0. A
behavioural decision maker, instead, does not fully internalize how their aspirations are determined
by their effort choices. While choosing effort e, a behavioural decision-maker takes g as fixed,
although at a behavioural solution, effort-aspirations pair is required to be mutually consistent
(self-fulfilling). Formally, a pair (e∗, g∗) is a BDP if (i) e∗ ∈ arg maxe∈[0,1] u(e, g∗, θ), and (ii)
g∗ = f(e∗, θ0). They use this set-up to distinguish “standard poverty traps”, in which external
constraints limit poor people’s productivity of effort, from “behavioural poverty traps”, in which
an “aspirations failure” causes poor people to exert less effort and fall even farther behind.
1.3.6 Nash vs. Stackelberg in an Intra-self Game
In a formal sense, we can interpret the distinction between a SDP and a BDP as corresponding
to the Stackelberg and, respectively, the Nash equilibrium of dual-self intra-personal game where
one self chooses actions a and the other self chooses the psychological state p and pi(a) describes
the best-response of the latter self for each a ∈ A. In a Stackelberg equilibrium, the self choosing
actions anticipates that the other self chooses a psychological state according to the function pi(.).
In a Nash equilibrium, both selves take the choices of the other self as given when making its own
choices. Consistent with the dynamic interpretation of the general framework introduced above,
in the definition of an SDP, internalization (i.e. rationally anticipating the actual effects of one’s
actions) is equivalent to the DM anticipating the equilibrium (e.g. one’s own actions is what one
expects it to be, or what others expect it to be) and behaving accordingly.26
2 Characterization of BDPs and SDPs
2.1 Axiomatic Restrictions on Choice Data
We now proceed to provide a choice theoretic axiomatic characterization of SDPs and BDPs in
order to examine the normative implications of models with endogenous psychological states.27 We
ask under what conditions choice data can be rationalized as the outcome of a SDP or a BDP.
26For example, consider the model of cognitive dissonance (e.g. Akerlof and Dickens, 1982) where the
psychological states are (endogenous) beliefs about the state of the world. In Akerlof and Dickens (1982), DMs
manipulate their own beliefs to conform to their desired beliefs under a rational expectations assumption.
27Note that in this setting, Proposition 1 continues to apply.
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In what follows, we show that both decision procedures are fully characterized by three axioms of
choice.
To fix ideas, in this section, we focus on the case where A and P are assumed to be finite,28
universal sets. Fix , pi : A → P and a family A of non-empty subsets of A. Define two choice
correspondences, S and B, from A to A as
S(A′) =
{
a ∈ A′ : (a, pi(a))  (a′, pi(a′)) for all a′ ∈ A′}
and
B(A′) = {a ∈ A′ : a pi(a) a′ for all a′ ∈ A′},
as the choices corresponding to a standard and behavioural decision procedure, respectively. Note
that S(A′) ⊆ A′ and B(A′) ⊆ A′ for each A′ ∈ A.29
We say that S(.) is admissible if the preference relation  is transitive over the set of consistent
decision states. We say that B(.) is admissible if for each a ∈ A, the preference relation pi(a)is
transitive over the set of actions.
Suppose we observe a non-empty correspondence C from A to A such that C(A′) ⊆ A′ for all
A′ ∈ A. We say that a SDP (respectively, a BDP) rationalizes C if there exist P , pi and  such
that C(A′) = S(A′) (respectively, C(A′) = B(A′)) for all A′ ∈ A.
Next, consider the following axioms introduced by Sen (1971):
Sen’s axiom α. For all A′, A′′ ⊆ A, if A′′ ⊆ A′ and C(A′)∩A′′ is non-empty, then C(A′)∩A′′ ⊆
C(A′′).
Sen’s axiom β. For all A′, A′′ ⊆ A, if A′′ ⊆ A′ and a, a′ ∈ C(A′′), then a ∈ C(A′) if and only
if a′ ∈ C(A′).
Sen’s axiom γ. Let M be any class of sets {A′k ⊆ A : k ≥ 1} and let V be the union of all sets
in M . Then any a that belongs to C(A′) for all A′ in M must belong to C(V ).
Axiom α requires that the choice correspondence be (weakly) increasing as the choice set shrinks
when all alternatives chosen in the larger set are also present in the smaller set. Axiom β requires
that when two actions are both chosen in a given set, and one of them is chosen in a larger set that
includes the first set, then both are chosen in the larger set. Axiom γ requires that if an action is
chosen in each set in a class of sets, it it must be also be chosen in their union.
We are now in a position to fully characterize choice data compatible with a SDP and a BDP.
We begin with SDPs.
28Given the absence of convexity assumptions in (A1)-(A5), Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 continue to
guarantee the existence of a SDP and a BDP when A and P are both finite sets.
29In contrast, S ⊆ A× P and B ⊆ A× P .
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PROPOSITION 2. Choice data C is rationalizable as the outcome of an admissible SDP if and
only if both Sen’s axioms α and β are satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 2 has two implications. First, choice data are compatible with an admissible SDP if
and only if they are compatible with rational choice theory. This is because rational choice theory
is falsifiable if Arrow’s (1959) axiom holds (and hence, WARP and menu independence) which is
in turn satisfied if and only if both Sen’s axioms α and β are satisfied (Sen, 1971: Theorems 3 and
7).30 This provides an axiomatic justification for a SDP to be the welfare benchmark that should
be used in the models that are encompassed in our framework. In Section 3.2 we expand this point
in further detail.
The second implication of Proposition 2 has to do with the identification of psychological states.
Suppose that we are interested in identifying P . Inasmuch as the choice data are rationalized as
the outcome of an admissible SDP, all we need is to identify one psychological state (note that we
can prove part (ii) of Proposition 2 by setting #P = 1).
Now we move on and characterize choice data compatible with a BDP.
PROPOSITION 3. Choice data C is rationalizable as the outcome of an BDP if and only if
both Sen’s axioms α and γ are satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix. 
One implication of Proposition 3 is that the outcomes of a BDP violates IIA.31 Deleting an
irrelevant alternative may expand the choice correspondence in the smaller set. Sen (1971) has
shown that choice data that satisfies axioms α and γ (but violates axiom β) can be represented
by a revealed preference relation over actions that violates transitivity. However, such a failure
of transitivity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for such choice to be rationalized as
the outcome of a BDP (and hence, in our setting, consistent with revealed welfare dominated
choice). For example, suppose A = {a, b, c} and C(A) = {a}, C({a, b}) = {a}, C({b, c}) = {b} but
C({c, a}) = {c}. Although such pattern of choice, exhibiting pairwise cycles, violates transitivity,
it cannot be rationalized as the outcome of a BDP (as axiom α would be violated). Axiom γ
implies that if a common alternative is chosen in two different sets of actions, then it would also
be chosen in their union; however, an alternative chosen in one of the two smaller sets (along with
30Arrow (1959)’s axiom (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)): If A′ ⊆ A and C(A) ∩ A′ is
non-empty, then C(A′) = C(A)∩A′. In words, when the set of feasible alternatives shrinks, the choice from
the smaller set consists precisely of those alternatives chosen in the larger set and remain feasible, if there
is any. WARP requires that for all non-empty A′, A′′ ⊆ A and for all a′, a′′ ∈ A′ ∩ A′′, if a′ ∈ C(A′) and
a′′ ∈ C(A′′), then a′ ∈ C(A′′). Richter (1966) carries out a revealed preferences analysis over the domain
of linear budget sets. Thus, his analysis cannot be directly applied to the choice scenario studied here as
we want to allow for finite actions sets. A menu is a non-empty subset A′ of A. A menu-specific revealed
preference for any a, a′ ∈ A′, aRA′a′ ⇔ a ∈ C(A′). Menu independent choice requires the existence of a
binary relation Ro over A such that for all non-empty A
′ ⊆ A and for all a, a′ ∈ A′, aRA′a′ ⇔ aRoa′.
31Masatlioglu and Ok (2005)’s axiomatic characterization of rational choice with status quo bias (exoge-
nous to the actions chosen by the DM) satisfies Arrow’s axiom among other axioms.
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the common alternative) need to be chosen in their union (violating axiom β).
The following result puts a lower bound on the number of psychological states required to
rationalize choice data as the outcome of an admissible BDP:
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose #A ≥ 3. Then, choice data C satisfying Sen’s axioms α and γ
(but not axiom β) can be rationalized as the outcome of an admissible BDP only if #P ≥ 2.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 4 shows that choice data satisfying Sen’s axioms α and γ (but not β) can be
rationalized as the outcome of a BDP only if #P > 1. Note that without the additional requirement
that choice data satisfying axioms α and γ be rationalized as the outcome of an admissible BDP, it
is without loss of generality to set #P = 1 in part (ii) of the proof of Proposition 3. If choice data
can be rationalized as the outcome of a BDP with #P = 1, then, by definition, a SDP outcome is
always a BDP outcome and vice versa so that it is not possible to show the existence of dominated
choice. It is only when the rationalisation of choice data as the outcome of a BDP requires that
#P > 1 that there is the possibility of dominated choice, a point dealt with explicitly in Proposition
5 and 6 below.
There remains the issue of whether we can further refine the lower bound on the number of
psychological states required to rationalise choice data satisfying Sen’s axioms α and γ (but not β)
as the outcome of an admissible BDP. Although a completely general answer is not possible, we
provide two examples where the minimum number of psychological states required to rationalise
choice data C is explicitly computed.
Example 1. Consider A = {a, b, c}, C ({a, b, c}) = {a, b}, C ({a, b}) = {a, b}, C ({a, c}) =
{a, c}, C ({b, c}) = {b} which satisfy axioms α and γ (but not β). By Proposition 4, we must have
that #P ≥ 2. Suppose #P = 2, with P = {p, q} and pi(a) = pi(b) = p and pi(c) = q. Then, we
have that a p b, b p a, a p c, b p c, c q a, b q c so that (by transitivity of q), b q a: in
this case with #P = 2 it is possible to rationalize the choice data as the outcome of an admissible
BDP. 
Example 2. Consider A = {a, b, c, d}, C ({a, b, c, d}) = {a}, C ({a, b, c}) = {a}, C ({a, b}) =
{a}, C ({a, c}) = {a, c}, C ({b, c}) = {b}, C ({b, c, d}) = {b}, C ({b, d}) = {b, d}, C ({c, d}) = {c},
C ({a, c, d}) = {a, c}, C ({a, d}) = {a, d}, C ({a, b, d}) = {a, d}; this choice data satisfies axioms α
and γ (but not β). By Proposition 4, we must have that #P ≥ 2. We want to show that #P ≥ 3.
Suppose #P = 2, with P = {p, q}. First note that pi(a) 6= pi (c). If pi(a) = pi (c), a pi(a) b, c pi(a) a
so that by transitivity, c pi(a) b: therefore, c ∈ C ({a, b, c}), a contradiction. So without loss of
generality, set pi(a) = p and pi(c) = q. Suppose now pi(b) = q, then a p b, a p c, b q c, c q a,
b q a (by transitivity) so that b ∈ C ({a, b, c}), a contradiction. Suppose pi(b) = p. Then a p b,
a p c, b p c, c q a, b q c, b q a (by transitivity). If pi(d) = p, we must have that d p a,
d p b, so that as a p c, b p c, by transitivity, d p c: therefore, d ∈ C ({b, c, d}), a contradiction.
If pi(d) = q, then d q b and as b q c, by transitivity, d q c so that d ∈ C ({c, d}), a contradiction.
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Therefore, pi(d) 6= p and pi(d) 6= q: hence, #P ≥ 3. In this case, let P = {p, q, r} with pi(a) = p,
pi(b) = pi(c) = q and pi(d) = r, it is straightforward to check that the above choice data can be
rationalized as the outcome of an admissible BDP. 
The preceding two examples show that the minimal #P required to rationalize choices as the
outcome of an admissible BDP could be #A− 1.32
2.2 Axiomatic Characterization: Related Literature
There is an emerging literature that provides axiomatic characterizations of decision-making mod-
els with some specific behavioural flavor.33 Relevant contributions to this literature are Manzini
and Mariotti (2007, 2012), Cherepanov et al. (2013) and Masatlioglu et al. (2012). A BDP is
observationally distinguishable from each of these models on the basis of choice data alone. To
start with, choice data consistent with the different procedures of choice proposed by each of these
papers can account for pairwise cycles, while choice data consistent with BDP cannot: pairwise
cycles of choice are inconsistent with Sen’s axiom α and γ. For example, pair wise cycles of choice
can be rationalized, for example, by Manzini and Mariotti’s (2012) Categorize then Choose (CTC)
procedure of choice, but is not consistent with a BDP. Moreover, the Rationalized Shortlist Method
(RSM) proposed by Manzini and Mariotti (2007) cannot accommodate menu dependence, whereas
a BDP can.
Like us, Masatlioglu et al.’s (2012) model of limited attention allows for violations of menu
independence, but in a form very different from (and incompatible with) our characterization of
BDP. They define a consideration set (a subset of the set of feasible alternatives) and assume
that the DM only pays attention to elements in the consideration set. In their paper, revealed
preferences are defined as follows: an alternative x is revealed preferred to y if x is chosen whenever
y is present and x is not chosen when y is deleted. That is, the choice of an alternative from a
set should be unaffected if an element which is not in the consideration set is deleted. If choice
changes when an alternative is deleted, then the latter alternative was in the consideration set and
32It is possible to explicitly characterize the maximal number of psychological states required to ra-
tionalize choice data satisfying Sen’s axioms α and γ as an outcome of a BDP. Given two decision sce-
narios D = (A,P, pi,) and D˜ = (A, P˜ , p˜i, ˜), we say D is equivalent to D˜ if and only if the follow-
ing two conditions are satisfied: (i) (a, pi(a))  (a′, pi(a′)) ⇔ (a, p˜i(a)) ˜ (a′, p˜i(a′)) for all a, a′ ∈ A; (ii)
(a, pi(a))  (a′, pi(a)) ⇔ (a, p˜i(a)) ˜ (a′, p˜i(a)) for all a, a′ ∈ A. Now, consider a fixed decision scenario
D = (A,P, pi,) and the decision scenario DId. = (A,P = A, Id., ˜) (where Id. denotes the identity func-
tion from A to itself) constructed as follows: (i) (a, a) ˜ (a′, a′) ⇔ (a, pi(a))  (a′, pi(a′)) for all a, a′ ∈ A,
(ii) (a, a) ˜ (a′, a) ⇔ (a, pi(a))  (a′, pi(a)) for all a, a′ ∈ A, with ˜ arbitrarily defined otherwise. Then,
DId. = (A,P = A, Id., ˜) is, by construction, equivalent to D = (A,P, pi,). It follows that given any deci-
sion scenario, there is an equivalent (both from a normative and behavioural perspective) decision scenario
where the set of psychological states is the set of actions and the function pi is the identity function. There-
fore, the maximal number of psychological states required to rationalize choice data C satisfying axioms α
and γ is #A.
33Manzini and Mariotti (2014) contrast the two existing approaches for welfare economics when agents
are bounded rational and make the case for these type of model-based approaches.
16
clearly the chosen alternative was revealed preferred to it. This is a violation of independence of
irrelevant alternatives, but in a form that is incompatible with Sen’s axiom α. Such data cannot
be rationalized as an outcome of a BDP, precisely because in a BDP (and also in a SDP), if x is
chosen whenever y is present, x must be chosen when y is deleted.
3 Welfare Implications
3.1 Revealing a (Partial) Welfare Ranking of Choices
In this section, we look at the welfare implications of bounded rationality as defined by our frame-
work. For simplicty of exposition, as in the preceeding section, we will assume that A and P are
universal, finite sets. We begin by defining the welfare ranking Ŵ as the induced ranking over ac-
tions implied by the ranking of consistent decision states. Formally, given a fixed decision scenario
D = (A,P, pi,) and a, b ∈ A, define aŴb only if (a, pi(a))  (b, pi(b)). We use Ŵ as our welfare
benchmark as it would correspond to preferences of a rational decision-maker who maximizes a
fixed preference relation over a set of feasible actions. By Proposition 2, whenever choice data C
satisfies Sen’s axioms α and β, (i) Ŵ coincides with revealed preferences in the sense of Samuelson
(1938), and (ii) all admissible standard decision scenarios that rationalize C imply the same welfare
ranking Ŵ over actions. Therefore, Ŵ can be inferred from choice data when the DM solves a
SDP. Now we ask the following two questions: Is it possible to reconstruct Ŵ from choice data
when the DM solves a BDP? If so, can we infer the existence of welfare dominated choice?
The recent influential work by BR on welfare analysis of non-rational choice addresses similar
questions. BR adopt the normative position that what matters for welfare is a binary relation
constructed solely on actions using choice data (that could violate axioms α and β) to derive a
partial preference ordering based on pairwise coherence (BR, Salant and Rubinstein, 2008 (SR)
and earlier Sen, 1971). BR define aW ∗b iff for all A′ ⊆ A such that {a, b} ⊆ A′, b /∈ C (A′). They
interpret W ∗ (a strict preference relation) as pairwise coherence and show that W ∗ is acyclic. They
define a as a weak welfare optimum whenever there exists no b ∈ A such that bW ∗a.
The advantage of W ∗ as a welfare criterion is that it never fails to pick welfare optima from
any choice situation. However: (i) the set of welfare optima identified using W ∗can be very large
and, as shown by Dalton and Ghosal (2012), for a fixed decision scenario D = (A,P, pi,), W ∗
may not coincide with Ŵ , which is problematic if W ∗ is used as the welfare ranking over actions
derived from choice data; (ii) BR assume a fixed set of psychological states, but psychological states
are difficult to observe in practice; (iii) by construction, pairwise coherence does not allow for the
possibility of dominated choice: if an alternative is chosen in a set, there is no other alternative in
that set which welfare dominates it.
In what follows, we derive a welfare ranking from choice data that addresses all these points,
reconstructing Ŵ for a DM who solves a BDP in a context in which P and pi are not observed.
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Suppose we observe choice data that satisfy Sen’s axiom’s α and γ (and not β). By Proposition 4,
these data can be rationalized as the outcome of an admissible BDP only if #P ≥ 2: this is clearly
a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing the normative significance of psychological
states.
Consider the following domain restriction over which such observed choice data have to be ra-
tionalised as the outcome of a BDP: a decision scenario D = (A,P, pi,) satisfies domain restriction
R if: (i)  is transitive over the set of consistent decision states, (ii) for each a ∈ A, the preference
relation pi(a)is transitive over A and (iii) for each a, a′ ∈ A, (a, pi(a))  (a′, pi(a′)) if and only if
(a, pi(a))  (a′, pi(a)) and (a, pi(a′))  (a′, pi(a′)). Conditions (i) and (ii) are the two admissibility
restrictions already imposed on a SDP and a BDP. Heuristically, condition (iii) states that the
ranking of actions should be neutral with respect to psychological states.34
Now define the partial welfare ordering W as follows:
Partial Welfare Ordering. Fix a choice correspondence C and consider a, b ∈ A. Then, aWb
if (1) there exists D = (A,P, pi,) that rationalizes C as the outcome of a BDP and satisfies R,
(2) (a, pi(a))  (b, pi(b)) under all decision scenarios D = (A,P, pi,) that satisfy (1).
Evidently, by construction, W agrees with Ŵ where both are well-defined.
In the spirit of Masatlioglu et al. (2012), we want to show that a vacuous satisfaction of the
partial welfare ordering does not occur, i.e. whenever choice data are rationalized by a BDP, there
exists at least one decision scenario that rationalizes the same choice data as the outcome of a BDP
and is consistent with the domain restriction R. To this end, we begin by pointing out that when
#A is finite, a preference relation satisfying domain restriction R would also ensure the existence
of a solution to a BDP and a SDP.
RESULT 1. Suppose #A is finite. When  satisfies domain restriction R, both a solution to a
BDP and a solution to a SDP exist.35
Proof. See Appendix. 
Result 1 has the implication that when preferences satisfy domain restriction R, a solution to
a SDP is also a solution to a BDP. Therefore, under the domain restriction R, S(A′) ⊆ B(A′) for
all non-empty A′ ⊆ A. As the proof makes clear, Result 1 relies in an essential way on conditions
(i) and (iii) in the definition of R (i.e. that the ranking of actions be neutral with respect of
psychological states) but not on condition (ii). As we shall show below, the reverse implication,
that a solution to a BDP is also a solution to a SDP, need not hold. This is a key feature to
34Munro and Sugden (2003), in their reformulation of Tversky and Kahneman, define a concept of
reference-neutral preferences. Their definition of loss aversion implies condition (iii) i.e., if a is preferred
to b in the reference neutral sense, then a is preferred to b when the reference point is a. For a fixed decision
scenario D = (A,P, pi,), Dalton and Ghosal (2012) show that when this condition is satisfied, Ŵ and W ∗
coincide where both are defined.
35Result 1 can be extended in a straightforward way to the case where A is a compact subset of some finite 
dimensional Euclidian space provided preferences satisfying the domain restriction R also satisfy a continuity 
restriction such as A1 (iii).
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inferring the existence of welfare dominated choice in specific settings.
The next proposition shows that whenever choice data are rationalized by a BDP, there exists
at least one decision scenario that rationalizes the same choice data as the outcome of a BDP and
is consistent with the domain restriction R.36
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose choice data C satisfy axioms α and γ. Then, there exists at least
one decision scenario D = (A,P, pi,) that rationalizes C as the outcome of a BDP and is consis-
tent with the domain restriction R.
Proof. See Appendix. 
A key implication of Proposition 5, taken together with Proposition 1, Corollary 1 and Result
1, is that any choice data that can be rationalised as the outcome of a BDP with an acyclic p for a
fixed p ∈ P can also be rationalised as the outcome of a BDP over a preference domain that satisfies
condition R. This implies observational equivalence between the different assumptions made on
individual preferences required, on the one hand, for existence of a BDP and, on the other hand,
for the welfare analysis carried out in this subsection.
In the next proposition, we show that W can be revealed using choice data. Specifically, we show
that W is a transitive extension of W ∗ and as a consequence, it is possible to infer the existence of
welfare dominated choices using W .
PROPOSITION 6. Suppose choice data C satisfy axioms α and γ. Suppose for a, b, c ∈ A,
aW ∗b and bW ∗c. Then, aWb, bWc and aWc.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Some remarks:
1. As choice data exhibiting pairwise cycles of choice are inconsistent with Sen’s axiom α, the
welfare benchmark Ŵ cannot be applied to all choice data exhibiting intransitivity.
2. Proposition 6 shows that W is a transitive extension of W ∗, key to showing the exis-
tence of dominated choice. By way of example, consider the following scenario where choice data
satisfy Sen’s axioms α and γ (but not β) and W ∗fails to be transitive i.e. {a} = C ({a, b, c}),
{a} = C ({a, b}), {b} = C ({b, c})and {a, c} = C ({a, c}). Then, clearly, aW ∗band bW ∗cbut
∼ aW ∗c. Therefore, using W ∗we would not be able to infer the existence of welfare dominated
choice. However, by Proposition 6, as W is a transitive extension of W ∗, we are able to show that
aWc.
3. The transitivity of the welfare benchmark Ŵ is a consequence of working under the domain
restriction R. Condition (i) in the domain restriction R (transitivity of preferences over the set of
consistent decision states) is equivalent to the requirement that S(.) is admissible which in turn is
equivalent to requiring that choice data satisfy Sen’s axioms α and β (Proposition 2). Condition
36Masatlioglu’s et al. (2012) representation involves a utility function u and an attention mapping ψ.
Their welfare criterion is such that, provided that a choice correspondence C admits a representation with
limited attention, one alternative a is a welfare improvement over another b if, for any representation (u, ψ)
of C, u(a) gives higher utility value than u(b).
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(i), together with condition (iii) in the domain restriction R, is used to show (in Propositions 5 and
6) that the welfare benchmark Ŵ is transitive: showing the transitivity of Ŵ does not necessarily
require the transitivity of p for a fixed p ∈ P . The transitivity of p for a fixed p ∈ P is required
to show (in Proposition 4) that choice data satisfying Sen’s axioms α and γ (but not β) can be
rationalized as the outcome of a BDP only if #P > 1. This latter point matters for the following
reason. If choice data can be rationalized as the outcome of a BDP with #P = 1, then, by
definition, a SDP outcome is always a BDP outcome and vice versa so that choice data can always
be rationalised as the outcome of a BDP satisfying condition (iii) in the domain restriction R.
However, in this case, it is not possible to show the existence of dominated choice. It is only when
the rationalisation of choice data as the outcome of a BDP requires that #P > 1 that there is the
possibility of dominated choice. Hence, condition (ii) in the domain restriction R (the transitivity
of p for a fixed p ∈ P ) is a necessary (but not sufficient condition) condition for dominated choice.
4. Finally, we note that BR’s welfare criterion is carried out for a fixed set of psychological
states. In this sense, our results on the partial welfare ordering W can be interpreted as providing
a characterization of the domain restrictions under which the use of BR’s pairwise coherence is
justified when psychological states have to be inferred from choice data in order to be rationalised
as the outcome of a BDP.
3.2 Welfare Benchmark for Existing Behavioural Economics Models
The welfare benchmark defined in this paper is the ranking over actions implied by the ranking
of consistent decision states. In this subsection, we illustrate how this welfare benchmark can be
applied to the behavioural economics models discussed throughout the paper.
In models of dynamic inconsistent preferences, the (induced) preferences of the initial self (once
the unique best-response of the future selves is taken onto account) provides the welfare benchmark.
In models with endogenous reference points, the induced preferences over actions (internalizing the
impact of actions on reference points) are the relevant welfare benchmark. In a decision problem
with anticipatory feelings, assuming that the best-response of the future self is unique, the opti-
mal solution of Caplin and Leahy (2001) provides the relevant benchmark. In a dual-self game,
given the interpretation of a SDP and a BDP as corresponding, respectively, to a Stackelberg and
Nash equilibrium of the dual-self game, the induced preferences of the self choosing actions at the
Stackelberg equilibrium provides the relevant normative benchmark.
In general, the best response the DMs self at t = 1 can be multi-valued. In this case, in our
model, pi(.), the feedback from actions to psychological states, will be a correspondence. The formal
definition of a SDP and a BDP when pi(.) is multi-valued is presented in the online Appendix.
Heuristically, when pi(.) is multi-valued, in a SDP we require that the DM chooses the consistent
action-psychological state pair that maximizes his preferences from the set of consistent decision
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states. In models with time-inconsistent preferences, a SDP corresponds to a Strotz equilibrium
where (a) the DM at t = 1 has multiple-best responses to the action chosen at t = 0, but (ii)
the DM at t = 0 is able to convince his future self at t = 1to choose the best-response action that
maximizes his payoff at t = 0. Thus, a SDP outcome is invariant to the selection of pi(.) and reduces
to the definition of a SDP for the case a single-valued pi(.).
Notice that our welfare benchmark contrasts with other alternative welfare rankings adopted
elsewhere in the literature. Some scholars have proposed to solve the model with one set of pref-
erence assumptions (e.g. hyperbolic discounting) and then to evaluate welfare using another set
of assumptions (e.g. geometric discounting) (see, for example, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2006). In
contrast to this approach, the difference between a SDP outcome and a BDP outcome reflects a
difference in decision-making procedures and not a shift in the preferences used to evaluate welfare.
Another approach applied in the literature of time-inconsistent preferences is the multiself Pareto
criterion, where the preferences of all the different selves in a time-inconsistent decision problem or
the preferences of both selves in a dual-self game are explicitly taken into account. In our frame-
work, in contrast, all that matters for welfare are the induced preferences of the initial self once
the best-response of the future self is taken into account.
3.3 Welfare Implications of Partial Prediction
In settings where the DM partially internalizes the impact of actions on psychological states, the
welfare impact of a greater degree of internalisation may be ambiguous. Below, we construct an
example where a DM who is able to partially predict how psychological states evolve with actions
may be worse-off than a DM who never predicts how psychological states evolve with actions.
We consider a decision scenario where the psychological state is multi-dimensional and the
DM internalizes the effect of his action on a subset of dimensions of such a vector and believes
that he doesn’t affect the complement. Let A × P ⊆ <K × <N and pi (a) be a non-empty and
single-valued function for each a ∈ A, with pi(a) = (pi1(a), ...., piN (a)), and for clarity of exposition,
assume that the binary relation  has a (expected) utility representation u : A × P → <. We
will assume that the DM is able to internalize the impact of choices on a subset of psychological
states. As before, we write pi(a) = (pi1(a), ..., piN (a)). Suppose the DM is able to internalize the
first M psychological states, 1 ≤ M ≤ N . Let P˜ denote the projection of P onto P ∩ <N−M
with p˜ denoting a representative element of P˜ . Let v˜ (a, p˜) = u(a, (pi1(a), ..., piM (a), pM+1, ..., pN )).
Let h˜(p) = {a ∈ A : a ∈ arg maxa∈A v˜ (a, p˜)}. In what follows, we will assume that h˜(p) is unique.
Fix a p0 ∈ P . A sequence of short-run outcomes is determined by the relations at ∈ h˜(pt−1)
and pt = pi(at), t = 1, 2, ...: at each step, the DM chooses a myopic best-response. Long-run
outcomes are denoted by a pair a, p with p = pi(a) and a is defined to be the steady-state solution
to the short-run outcome functions i.e. a = h˜(pi(a)). It follows that long-run behavior corresponds
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to the outcome of a BDP where the preferences are represented by a utility function v˜ (a, p˜) =
u(a, (pi1(a), ..., piM (a), pM+1, ..., pN )).
Next, we construct an example to show that a DM who is able to partially predict how psycho-
logical states evolve with actions may be worse-off than a DM who never predicts how psychological
states evolve with actions.
Example 3. Consider the following decision scenario where there are two payoff relevant
dimensions of choice with outcome denoted x1and x2 and preferences u(x) = x1+v1(x1−r1)+x2+
v2(x2 − r2) where v(·)is a Kahneman-Tversky value function with vi(z) = z if z ≥ 0, v(z) = αiz,
αi > 1if z < 0 and v(0) = 0. There are two options. Option 1 is defined by (x1 = 3, x2 = 2)and
option 2 is (x1 = 6, x2 = 0). Assume that piis the identity map so that in a consistent decision state
the reference point corresponds to current choice of the DM.
Suppose the DM does not predict that the reference point shifts in both dimensions 1 and 2.
The payoff table below provides a quick summary of the decision problem in this case:
reference point 1 reference point 2
option 1 5 7− 3α1
option 2 9− 2α2 6
A straightforward computation establishes that (option 2, reference point 2) is the unique BDP
outcome whenever α1 >
1
3 and α2 < 2.
Now suppose the DM is able to predict that the reference point will shift in the first dimension
but not in the second dimension. The payoff table below provides a quick summary of the decision
problem in this case:
reference point 1 reference point 2
option 1 5 7
option 2 6− 2α2 6
A straightforward computation shows that whenever α2 ≥ 1, (option 1, reference point 1) is the
unique BDP outcome.
As (option 2, reference point 2) always payoff dominates (option 1, reference point 1), partial
prediction makes the DM worse-off.
4 Concluding Remarks
All of the welfare economics we know is based on the assumption that people choose what is best
for them, and that we can accordingly use these choices as a guide to welfare policy. Once we
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build realistic behavioural features into our models, this foundation is lost. Can we still extract
some normatively relevant information from choices in a context in which DMs may not be utility
maximizers? Arguably, this is an ongoing puzzle of key importance and we believe this paper
contributes with some ammunition towards a better understanding of the normative implications
of behavioural economics.
The first contribution of this paper is to offer a simple, yet unifying platform that encom-
passes different existing work in the literature on behavioural economics, and allow for self-fulfilling
mistakes. This platform is not meant to explain a new behavioural procedure of choice, but it
constitutes a necessary initial step to address the general question of how to do welfare economics
with agents who make (self-fulfilling) mistakes.
Second, we offer a full axiomatic characterization of behavioural decisions based on choice data
alone. If observed behavior is consistent with Sen’s axioms α and γ (but not β), it is consistent
with a decision-maker who doesn’t fully internalize all the consequences of his actions.
Third, we propose a unified welfare benchmark for behavioural economics that is justified in
standard axioms of choice (Sen’s axioms α and β) and can be applied to existing seminal be-
havioural economics models. The benchmark proposed here has the same characterization of ratio-
nal choice theory, which has been used since Samuelson’s (1938) as the standard welfare benchmark
in economics. We illustrate the welfare benchmark implied from our framework with examples
on time-inconsistent preferences, endogenous reference-dependent preferences, anticipatory feelings
and dual-self games.
Fourth, we propose a (partial) welfare ranking which, under a domain restriction, can be revealed
using choice data and be used to infer welfare dominated (i.e. mistaken) choice. In this regard,
we are able to deal, at least partially, with a key concern raised by behavioral welfare economics:
how to perform welfare analysis if choices do not always reveal decision-makers’ best interest. Note
that Bernheim and Rangel (2009), by the very nature of their formalisation, cannot identify welfare
dominated choices.
Fifth, we show that in settings where the DM partially internalizes the impact of actions on
psychological states, the welfare impact of a greater degree of internalisation maybe ambiguous.
All in all, this paper demonstrates that it is still possible to extract normatively relevant infor-
mation from observed choices, even when we relax the full rationality assumption. In future work,
we plan to extend this work to examine behavioral decision-making under uncertainty and explore,
in greater detail, the policy implications of behavioral decision-making.
Tilburg University, Economics Department; CentER; CAGE
University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business School
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Propositions 1 and 2 in Ghosal (2011) show that assumptions (A1)-(A5), taken together, are
sufficient to ensure that Ψ(p) is non-empty and compact and for each p ∈ P , Ψ(p) is a sublattice
of A where both the maximal and minimal elements, denoted by a¯(p) and a(p) respectively, are
increasing functions on P . To complete the proof of Proposition 1, define a map Ψ : A×P → A×P ,
Ψ(a, p) = (Ψ1(p),Ψ2(a)) as follows: for each (a, p), Ψ1(p) = {a′ ∈ A :p (a′) = φ} and Ψ2(a) =
pi (a). It follows that Ψ1(p) is a compact (and consequently, complete) sublattice of A and has a
maximal and minimal element (in the usual component wise vector ordering) denoted by a¯(p) and
a(p) respectively. Therefore, the map (a¯(p), pi(a)) is an increasing function from A × P to itself
and as A×P is a compact (and hence, complete) lattice, by applying Tarski’s fix-point theorem, it
follows that (a¯, p¯) = (a¯(p¯), pi(a¯)) is a fix-point of Ψ and by a symmetric argument, (a(p), pi(a)) is an
increasing function from A×P to itself and (a, p) = (a(p), pi(a)) is also a fix-point of Ψ; moreover,
(a¯, p¯) and
(
a, p
)
are respectively the largest and smallest fix-points of Ψ.
(ii) By assumption A is compact and pi is a continuous function so that the set
{p ∈ P : p = pi(a) for some a ∈ A}
is compact and therefore, the set of consistent decision states is compact. Then, under the assump-
tion that  is acyclic and has an open lower section, it follows that S is non-empty from Bergstrom
(1975).
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) We show that if choice data are rationalizable as the outcome of an admissible SDP, then,
both Sen’s axiom α and β hold. Fix , pi : A→ P . For A′′ ⊆ A′ ⊆ A, if
a ∈ S(A′) =
{
a : (a, p)  (a′, p′) for all a′ ∈ A′, p′ = pi(a′)
and p = pi(a)
}
then
a ∈ S(A′′) =
{
a : (a, p)  (a′, p′) for all a′ ∈ A′′, p′ = pi(a′)
and p = pi(a)
}
.
Therefore, S(A′) = C(A′) ∩ A′′ ⊆ C(A′′) = S(A′′) so that Sen’s axiom α is satisfied. Next, given
A′′ ⊆ A′, suppose a′, a′′ ∈ C(A′′) = S(A′′) but a′ ∈ S(A′) and a′′ /∈ S(A′). By construction, both
(a′, p′)  (a′′, p′′) and (a′, p′)  (a′′, p′′) for p′ = pi(a′) and p′′ = pi(a′′). Therefore, by transitivity of
 over consistent decision states, a′′ ∈ S(A′), a contradiction so that Sen’s axiom β is satisfied.
(ii) We show that if choice data satisfy Sen’s axioms α and β, they are rationalizable as the
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outcome of an admissible SDP. To this end, we specify pi : A→ P , #P ≥ 1 so that pi is onto. Next
we specify preferences : for each non-empty A′ ⊆ A and a ∈ C(A′),  satisfies the condition
that (a, p)  (a′, p′) for all a′ ∈ A′, p = pi(a) and p′ = pi(a′), p, p′ ∈ P . Consider C(A′) for some
non-empty A′ ⊆ A. By construction if a ∈ C(A′)⇒ S(A′) and therefore, C(A′) ⊆ S(A′). We need
to check that for the above specification of , pi : A→ P , S(A′) ⊆ C(A′). Suppose to the contrary,
there exists a′ ∈ S(A′) but a′ /∈ C(A′). It follows that (a′, pi(a′))  (b, pi(b)) for all b ∈ A′. Since
a′ /∈ C(A′), by construction this is only possible if for each b ∈ A′, a′ ∈ C(A′′b ) with {a, b} ⊆ A′′b .
By Sen’s axiom α, as a′ ∈ C({a, b}) and as {a, b} ⊆ A′, again by Sen’s axiom α, b ∈ C({a, b}) for
b ∈ C(A′). Now, by construction, A′ = ∪b∈A′ {a, b}. By Sen’s axiom β, a′ ∈ C(A′). Therefore,
S(A′) = C(A′). Finally, note that when choice data satisfy axioms α and β,  is transitive (Sen,
1971: Theorem 1) and therefore, S(A′) is admissible. 
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) We show that if choice data are rationalizable as the outcome of a BDP, then both Sen’s α
and γ hold. Fix , pi : A→ P . For A′′ ⊆ A′ ⊆ A, if
a ∈ B(A′) = {a : a pi(a) a′ for all a′ ∈ A′}
then
a ∈ B(A′′) = {a : a pi(a) a′ for all a′ ∈ A′′} .
Therefore, C(A′) ∩A′′ ⊆ C(A′′) as required so that Sen’s axiom α is satisfied. Next, let M denote
a class of sets {A′k ⊆ A : k ≥ 1}. If
a ∈ B(A′k) =
{
a : a pi(a) a′ for all a′ ∈ A′k
}
and V = ∪k≥1A′k, it follows that
a ∈ B(V ) = {a : a pi(a) a′ for all a′ ∈ V }
so that Sen’s axiom γ is satisfied.
(ii) We show that if choice data satisfy both Sen’s α and γ, they are rationalizable as the out-
come of a BDP. To this end, we specify pi : A→ P so that #P ≥ 1 and pi is onto. Next we specify
preferences : for each non-empty A′ ⊆ A and a ∈ C(A′),  satisfies the condition that a p a′
for all a′ ∈ A′ and p = pi(a). Consider C(A′) for some non-empty A′ ⊆ A. By construction if
a ∈ C(A′), then a ∈ B(A′) and therefore, C(A′) ⊆ B(A′). We need to check that for the above
specification of , pi : A→ P , B(A′) ⊆ C(A′). Suppose to the contrary, there exists a′ ∈ B(A′) but
a′ /∈ C(A′). It follows that a′ p′ b for each b ∈ A′ and p′ = pi(a′). Since a′ /∈ C(A′), by construction
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this is only possible only if a′ ∈ C(A′′b ) for some A′′b with {a′, b} ⊆ A′′b . Let A′′ = ∪b∈A′A′′b . It follows
that a′ ∈ A′′ and by Sen’s axiom γ, a′ ∈ C(A′′). As A′ ⊆ A′′ and a′ ∈ C(A′′), by Sen’s axiom α,
a′ ∈ C(A′) a contradiction. Therefore, B(A′) = C(A′). 
Proof of Proposition 4
If choice data satisfy Sen’s axioms α and γ (but not axiom β) and #A ≥ 3, then there exists
two non-empty sets A′ and A′′ with A′ ⊆ A, A′′ ⊆ A and A′′ ⊆ A′ such that (C(A′) ∩A′′) ⊂ C(A′′).
Assume that #P = 1 with P = {p}. Consider the preference relation defined over actions p where
P = {p} and for each non-empty A′ ⊆ A and a ∈ C(A′), p satisfies the condition that a p a′
for all a′ ∈ A′ and p = pi(a). We require that this choice data be rationalized as the outcome of a
BDP (i.e. B(A′) = C (A′), A′ ⊆ A) with #P = 1 and P = {p}, p = pi(a) for all a ∈ A and p is
transitive. Then, there exists b, c ∈ A′′ s.t. b ∈ (C(A′) ∩A′′), c ∈ C(A′′) but c /∈ C(A′). Therefore,
it follows that both b p c and c p b so that as p is transitive, c p a whenever b p a for any
a ∈ A; therefore, c ∈ C(A′), a contradiction. It follows that #P > 1 and so in part (ii) of the proof
of Proposition 3, we must have that #P ≥ 2. 
Proof of Result 1
When preferences satisfy domain restriction R,  is transitive over the set of consistent decision
states. Given that #A is finite, the existence of a SDP immediately follows. Therefore, there exists
a ∈ A such that (a, pi(a))  (a′, pi(a′)) for all a′ ∈ A. As preferences satisfy domain restriction R,
(a, pi(a))  (a′, pi(a)) for all a′ ∈ A so that a solution to a BDP exists as well. 
Proof of Proposition 5
By Proposition 3(i), we already know that when C satisfies axioms α and γ the decision scenario
D = (A,P, pi,) specified so that pi : A → P , #P ≥ 1 and pi is onto, and the preference relation
 such that for each non-empty A′ ⊆ A and a ∈ C(A′), a p a′, p = pi(a), for all a′ ∈ A′, already
rationalizes C the outcome of a BDP. By inspection, it is straightforward to check that the proof
of Proposition 3(ii) continues to hold when D = (A,P, pi,) is such that A = P and pi : A → A
is the identity map. Suppose, in addition, we require that D = (A,P, pi,) is consistent with the
domain restriction R. If {a} = C ({a, a′}), then it follows that (a, a)  (a′, a) and (a, a′)  (a′, a′)
so that (a, a)  (a′, a′); if {a′} = C ({a′, a′′}), it follows that (a′, a′)  (a′′, a′) and (a′, a′′)  (a′′, a′′)
so that (a′, a′)  (a′′, a′′). It follows that (a, a)  (a′′, a′′) ⇔ (a, a)  (a′′, a) and (a, a′′)  (a′′, a′′)
so that a ∈ B({a, a′′}). We check that a ∈ C ({a, a′′}). So suppose {a′′} = C ({a, a′′}). Then,
{a′′} = C ({a, a′′}) ⇒ a /∈ C ({a, a′, a′′}) while a′ = C ({a′, a′′}) ⇒ a′′ /∈ C ({a, a′, a′′}). Therefore,
{a′} = C ({a, a′, a′′}) and by axiom α, a′ ∈ C ({a, a′}), a contradiction. Therefore, a ∈ C ({a, a′′})
so that it is without loss of generality to assume that the preference relation a is transitive over
A. It follows that if choice data satisfy both Sen’s α and γ, they are rationalizable as the outcome
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of a BDP where there exists at least one decision scenario D = (A,P, pi,) that also rationalizes
C and is consistent with the domain restriction R. 
Proof of Proposition 6
As aW ∗b and bW ∗c, it follows that {a} = C ({a, b}) and {b} = C ({b, c}) (both C ({a, b}) and
C ({b, c}) must be non-empty, b is never chosen in the presence of a and c is never chosen in the
presence of b); hence, {a} = C ({a, b, c}). As choice data satisfies axiom α, a ∈ C ({a, c}). Suppose
we require that this choice data to be rationalized as the outcome of an admissible BDP satisfy-
ing the domain restriction R. From the proof of Proposition 5, it also follows that aWb, bWc.
If {a} = C ({a, c}), then (a, pi(a))  (c, pi(a)) and (a, pi(c))  (c, pi(c)) so that under the domain
restriction R it necessarily follows that (a, pi(a))  (c, pi(c)) and hence, aWc. Next, suppose that
{a, c} = C ({a, c}). First, note that the choice data satisfy Sen’s axioms α and γ (but not β).
Therefore, by Proposition 4, #P ≥ 2. Suppose #P = 2 with P = {p1, p2}, p1 6= p2 and pi(a) = p1
and pi(b) = pi(c) = p2. Consider the preference relation defined over actions p where for each
non-empty A′ ⊆ A and a ∈ C(A′), p satisfies the condition that a p a′ for all a′ ∈ A′ and
p = pi(a). Then, a p1 b, a p1 c, b p2 c, c p2 a and by transitivity of p2 , b p2 a which
implies that C ({a, b}) = {a, b} a contradiction. Next, suppose that #P = 2 with P = {p1, p2},
and pi(a) = pi(c) = p1 and pi(b) = p2. Then, a p1 b, a p1 c, b p2 c, b p2 c, c p2 a and a p2 b
and by transitivity of p1 , c p1 b which implies that C ({a, b, c}) = {a, c} a contradiction. So
suppose #P = 2 with P = {p1, p2}, and pi(a) = pi(b) = p1 and pi(c) = p2. Then, a p1 b, a p1 c,
b p1 c, b p2 c, c p2 a and b p2 a. It follows by domain restriction R that (b, p1)  (c, p2) and as
(a, p1)  (b, p1), (a, p1)  (c, p2). Therefore, aWc and C ({a, c}) = {a, c} contains the dominated
action c. By Proposition 5, it remains to check the case when p1, p2, p3 ∈ P p1 6= p2 6= p3 with
pi(a) = p1, pi(b) = p2 and pi(c) = p3. Then, a p1 b, a p1 c, a p2 b, b p2 c, b p3 c, c p3 a and
b p3 a. It follows that (a, p1)  (b, p2) and (b, p2)  (c, p3) so that (a, p1)  (c, p2) so that aWc
and again, C ({a, c}) = {a, c} contains the dominated action c.
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